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to examine the impact of removing barriers to bank entry on bank competition and economic growth. As
governments were not concerned about systemic stability in this period, we are able to isolate the effects
of bank competition from those of state implicit guarantees. We find that the introduction of free banking
laws stimulated the creation of new banks and led to more bank failures. Our empirical evidence indicates
that states adopting free banking laws experienced an increase in output per capita compared to the states
that retained state bank chartering policies. We argue that the fiercer bank competition following the
introduction of free banking laws might have spurred economic growth by (1) increasing the money stock
and the availability of credit; (2) leading to efficiency gains in the banking market. Our findings suggest that
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growth in a system without public safety nets.
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I. Introduction
The optimal level of competition among banks is a long-standing question. It has been argued that bank
competition promotes economic growth by improving efficiency in the banking market (see e.g. Jayaratne
and Strahan, 1996, 1998). On the other hand, bank regulators are concerned about bank competition for its
effects on the risk of bank failure. As bank failures might have huge social costs in terms of GDP growth,
competition should be controlled in order to guarantee the stability of the financial system (see e.g Vives,
2010). As these two views have opposite predictions, the effect of bank competition on economic growth is
ultimately an empirical question.
We shed new light on this question by testing how the introduction of free banking laws between 1837
and 1863 affected bank competition and economic growth in US counties. With the introduction of free
banking laws, US states gave up their power over bank chartering and allowed any individual to establish
a bank subject to a set of legally defined requirements.1 Historical accounts suggest that free banking laws
lifted barriers to bank entry, as a wave of bank entry followed their introduction (Hammond, 1957). Using
the state-by-year variation in free banking laws, we are able to test three hypotheses on the effects of lifting
barriers to bank entry. First, we examine whether the relaxation of barriers to bank entry affected bank
competition and bank exit in US counties using Weber’s (2006, 2011a) databases on antebellum bank balance
sheets and census of state banks. Second, we merge these two databases with the decennial US Census data
to investigate whether the relaxation of barriers to bank entry had an impact on local economic growth.2
Third, we provide evidence on specific channels through which bank competition might have affected eco-
nomic growth. In particular, we investigate whether the relaxation of barriers to bank entry spurred local
financial development and led to dynamic efficiency gains in the banking market.
One concern with studies of bank competition and economic growth based on modern data is the con-
founding effect of state implicit guarantees. Regulators adverse to bank failures, for example, will likely
prefer to bail-out an inefficient bank rather than letting it out of the market. As inefficient banks are able
to continue operating, there will be presumably efficiency losses.3 Disentangling these effects from those of
1Typical requirements were a minimum level of capital and bond-secured banknote circulation (see e.g. Rockoff, 1972; Hasan,
1987). See Section 2 for a more detailed description of the US banking regulation during the antebellum period.
2The US Census data are retrieved from the ICPSR file 2896 (Haines, 2010).
3Hoshi and Kashyap (2004) and Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008), for example, document efficiency losses in the real
sector due to the misallocation of credit by ailing banks that the regulator allowed to continue operating during the Japanese
banking crisis in the 1990s.
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competition might be difficult in studies based on modern data. Focusing on the US free banking period
(1837-1863) allows us to circumvent this problem. As systemic stability was not among the objectives of
bank regulation at that time (Mitchener and Jaremski, 2012), we are able to isolate the effects of bank
competition from those of state-implicit guarantees.
Our main finding is that the introduction of free banking laws significantly affected the banking sector in
US counties. Our county-level estimates show that the introduction of free banking laws caused a 35% rise
in the share of new banks and a 137% increase in the fraction of failed banks, relative to the unconditional
mean of these variables. There is no statistically significant effect on bank closures due to the introduction of
free banking laws. Our interpretation of these findings is that the introduction of free banking laws relaxed
the barriers to entry and allowed more banks to enter the market. Along with a higher degree of bank
competition, the introduction of free banking laws caused more bank failures. Since these two effects have
opposite implications for the real economy, we assess whether the introduction of free banking laws had an
overall beneficial or detrimental effect on economic growth. Our empirical evidence suggests that there is
a positive and statistically significant link between the relaxation of barriers to bank entry and economic
growth during the 1830-1860 period. Our estimates indicate that counties in states that adopted free banking
laws experienced a 20% increase in output per capita.
Since our empirical analysis exploits the state-by-year variation in the introduction of free banking laws,
there could be a concern that omitted variables drive our results. For example, it might be that the states
who introduced free banking laws were those with the most promising growth opportunities. To address
this concern, we exploit the within-county variation of our panel dataset, which allows us to control for any
time-invariant county characteristics, state-specific linear trends, and any region-by-year variation, such as
business cycles and growth trends at the regional level. Another concern with our study is that we might
erroneously consider our results as the effect of free banking laws rather than changes in other state-by-year
varying laws that occurred at the same time. To address this concern, we collected data on a set of state laws
that could affect bank competition, bank exit and economic growth. These state laws include usury laws,
incorporation laws, limited liability laws, state-specific liability insurance systems and clearing arrangements.
In our empirical analysis, we control for these laws in order to isolate the effect of free banking laws.
To further improve identification, we provide alternative estimation strategies that are tailored to deal
with unobserved heterogeneity. We repeat our empirical analysis restricting the sample to contiguous coun-
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ties lying on the border of states that passed a free banking law at different points in time.4 The main
advantage of this approach is that geographically close counties are more likely to be similar in terms of
unobservables factors such as growth trends and local economic shocks. We also employ Altonji, Elder, and
Taber (2005)’s method to assess how large the selection effect on unobservables compared to observables
must be in order to explain away the estimated effect of free banking laws. As a further robustness check, we
test for anticipation effects and whether the introduction of free banking laws was systematically related to
any observable pre-existing county characteristics. We show that all our findings are robust to the different
specifications and estimation techniques discussed above.
The final contribution of this paper is to examine through which channels the fiercer bank competition
caused by free banking laws may have affected economic growth. The first channel we consider is financial
development. Using the same estimation method as for the economic growth regressions, we find that coun-
ties in states that adopted free banking laws experienced a 62% increase in loans per capita and an expansion
in the stock of money per capita by 149%, relative to the unconditional mean of these variables. Our find-
ings suggest that the introduction of free banking laws facilitated bank entry, which led to an expansion in
credit and money supply and allowed firms that were credit-constrained under the state-chartering regime
to finance their investment opportunities.
The second channel we consider is dynamic efficiency. One may argue that the introduction of free
banking laws enhanced bank competition, which drove the inefficient banks out of the market and allowed
the efficient banks to grow faster. We test the dynamic efficiency hypothesis by performing a bank-level
analysis on the sample of banks existing prior to the introduction of free banking laws (incumbent banks).
We first provide evidence that incumbent banks became more efficient after the introduction of free banking
laws, as their probability of closure decreased by 39% of its unconditional mean, while their probability of
failure remained unaffected. We then show that the introduction of free banking laws led to a reallocation
in the banking market. The banks who closed during our sample period grew 9.8 percentage points less,
those who failed grew 2.7 percentage points more, while those who survived our sample period remained
unaffected. We argue that the estimated redistribution effect improved the efficiency of the banking system,
as the banks who closed were presumably the inefficient ones and those who failed were likely those lending
4Huang (2008) proposed a similar strategy that uses contiguous county-pairs separated by state borders to investigate the
local economic effects of relaxing bank-branching restrictions in the US between 1975 and 1990. Danisewicz, McGowan, Onali,
and Schaek (2013) uses a similar regression discontinuity design to examine the effects of regulatory enforcement actions on
local economic growth.
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more or financing high risk-return investment opportunities.
Our findings have implications for the literature on bank competition and financial stability, the finance-
growth nexus, and the US financial history literature. Our results on the structure of the banking market
provide new evidence in support of the “competition-instability” view, which postulates that fiercer com-
petition makes banks more likely to go bankrupt (see Marcus, 1984; Chan, Greenbaum, and Thakor, 1986;
Keeley, 1990, for example). This view is widely accepted among bank regulators, even though other scholars
have raised doubts,5 and empirical tests based on contemporary data have not found conclusive evidence.6
Focusing on a period where state implicit guarantees were absent, we are able to rule out the confounding
effect of bank moral hazard on risk taking and isolate the effect of bank competition.
Our empirical evidence on economic growth is in line with the finance-growth nexus literature, which
argues that finance leads growth (see e.g. King and Levine, 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Rousseau and
Sylla, 2005).7 In an exercise similar to ours, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) find that the relaxation of
branching restrictions in the US between 1978 and 1992 had a positive effect on economic growth. Jayaratne
and Strahan (1998), DeYoung, Hasan, and Kirchhoff (1998) and Evanoff and Ors (2002) document dynamic
efficiency gains following the relaxation of branching restrictions between 1978 and 1992, while Carlson and
Mitchener (2009) find similar results examining bank branching in California during the 1920s and 1930s.
We confirm these findings using the state-by-year variation in the introduction of free banking laws in the
US during the 1837-1863 period.
Our results suggest that the more frequent bank failures caused by the introduction of free banking laws
did not harm economic growth, at least over the 1830-1860 period that we are considering. It is important
to stress that we are not making any claims on the short-run impact of bank failures on output growth,
which might be as well significant. We rather interpret our findings along the lines of Rancière, Tornell,
and Westermann (2008), who show that countries experiencing occasional financial crises have an average
growth rate higher than countries with a stable financial system. The authors argue that credit-constrained
firms become able to raise funds and invest after countries liberalize their financial sector. As a result, the
5The competition-stability view developed by Boyd and DeNicolo (2005) suggests that banks with greater market power
charge higher interest rates which in turn induces borrower to choose riskier projects. Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) show
there is a U-shaped relationship between competition and banks’ default risk.
6Examples of recent empirical studies are Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2009) and Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt, and Zhu
(2012). See also the surveys of Beck (2008) and Vives (2010) and the references therein for further information on the link
between competition and financial stability.
7For further information on the finance-growth nexus we refer to the excellent surveys of Levine (2005) and Papaioannou
(2008) and the references therein.
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economic activity increases, but credit risk does as well. Besides our county-level evidence, this narrative
might also explain why the incumbent banks who failed during our sample period grew faster following the
introduction of free banking laws. It might be that banks’ default was the consequence of increased compe-
tition, which pushed these banks to expand their exposure to new or previously credit-constrained firms.
Our results also provide new insights on the US free banking literature. Economic historians have argued
that free banking laws facilitated bank entry (e.g. Hammond, 1957), but the empirical literature provides
conflicting evidence (see Ng, 1988; Bodenhorn, 1990, 1993, 2008; Economopoulos and O’Neill, 1995). We
document that free banking led to more bank entry employing alternative identification strategies and using
a more comprehensive data set. There is a large literature on the causes of the instability of free banks,
i.e. the banks chartered under free banking laws (see Rolnick and Weber, 1984, 1985; Economopoulos, 1990;
Jaremski, 2010, for example). In contrast to these studies, we do not investigate the sources of instability
of free banks per se, but we examine how the introduction of free banking laws affected bank failures, both
at the county and bank-level. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first investigating the effect of
free banking laws on bank closures in the US, both at the county and bank-level.
There is a large literature on the history of financial development and economy growth in the US (see
e.g. Sylla, 1999; Bodenhorn, 2000; Rousseau, 2003), but only a few papers investigating the role of finance
in local economic growth during the free banking era. Jaremski and Rousseau (2012) study the relationship
between banks and economic growth in the US at the county level, whereas Bodenhorn and Cuberes (2010)
examine the effect of banking activity on city growth in the Northeastern United States between 1790 and
1870. In contrast to those papers, we do not analyze the direct growth effect of banks per se, but we assess
whether counties in the states that adopted free banking laws grew more than their counterparts in states
that retained state-chartering policies. We believe this is an hypothesis worth studying as the positive effects
of free banking might operate not only through the size of the banking activity, but also at a more aggregate
level through the efficiency gains arising in a more competitive banking market.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the free banking
era tailored to the purpose of our study. Section 3 describes the data. In Section 4, we study the effect of
free banking laws on bank competition and bank exit. Section 5 presents the results on the link between free
banking laws and local economic growth. Section 6 presents the results on the channels. Section 7 provides
further robustness checks to address potential threats to our identification strategy. Section 8 concludes.
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II. The Free Banking Era (1837-1863)
Our study investigates the effect of removing barriers to bank entry on bank competition and economic growth
during the US free banking era. In this section, we explain why focusing on this period is appropriate for
the purpose of our study. We also identify some potential concerns and discuss how we are able to address
them. We consider three aspects of the free banking period that are particularly relevant for our study:
Bank chartering policies, bank regulation, and the finance-growth nexus.
A. Bank Chartering Policies in the US between 1837 and 1863
Bank chartering was one of the main aspects of bank regulation in the US between 1837 and 1863.8 Crucially
for the purpose of our study, bank chartering policies were decided at the state rather than federal-level,
and underwent reforms over the course of this period. Before 1837, bank chartering was the means through
which states exerted their control over banks.9 In order to open up a bank, the aspiring banker had to
apply for a bank charter. The state government decided whether to grant the charter and, in case it did,
the regulator set the requirements the bank had to satisfy. Requirements differed from bank to bank, but
generally consisted of an initial capital level and constraints on the allocation of funds.10 It was usually
difficult to obtain a bank charter, because states wanted to limit the number of banks in order to protect
the interests of incumbents (see e.g. Bodenhorn, 2006, 2008).
Starting from Michigan in 1837, New York and Georgia in 1838, US states introduced free banking laws
(see Table 1). Free banking laws allowed any individual to open up a bank subject to a set of legal require-
ments. Banks chartered under free banking laws were typically obliged to hold a minimum amount of capital
and back their banknote circulation with government bonds or mortgages (see e.g. Rockoff, 1972; Hasan,
1987; Jaremski, 2010).
What leads us to consider the introduction of free banking laws as a relaxation of barriers to bank entry
is the fact that governments gave up their discretionary power in granting bank charters. The decision to
open a bank became an administrative rather than a political process, as the aspiring banker needed only
8See Bodenhorn (2002), Hammond (1957), and Schweikart (1987) for a description of banking in the antebellum US, for
example.
9Few states had general banking laws. Banking laws usually defined managers and shareholders liability and tied banknote
circulation to bank capital or specie. In no state the law allowed individuals to open a bank without a charter; see Dewey
(1910), Knox (1903), and Hendrickson (2011) for banking regulation in the 19th century US.
10Some charters required banks to lend to companies involved in the construction of railroads or canals, or to invest in state
bonds (e.g. Knox, 1903).
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to fulfill some legal requirements (see Bodenhorn, 2004). Hence, the introduction of free banking laws could
have fostered competition in two ways. First, it gave any individual the opportunity to open up a bank in
profitable markets where the incumbent enjoyed monopoly rents. Second, it incentivized incumbent (state
chartered) banks to act in a more competitive manner in order to prevent bank entry.
One concern with our study is that the introduction of free banking laws might not have been a random
event. Bodenhorn (2004) examines the reform process that led to the introduction of free banking laws in
New York. He argues that the reform impulse arose from the dissatisfaction with the existing banking sys-
tem, which was perceived as corrupt and inadequate to satisfy the increased demand for credit. Bodenhorn
also maintains that a random component strongly influenced the introduction of the 1838 Free Banking Act,
as the demand for credit in New York was likely to be as high as in other states. The author points out a
series of events unrelated to the state of the economy that led to the formation of an organized opposition
to the political class in power before 1838.11
As we are not aware of other case studies similar to Bodenhorn’s, we discuss the concerns on the endo-
geneity of free banking laws taking New York as a benchmark. Even though Bodenhorn remarks a random
component in the introduction of free banking laws, his analysis suggests that the relaxation of the barriers
to bank entry could be driven by a higher demand for credit. Hence, the higher growth rate, the creation
of new banks and the more frequent bank failures would not be the effect of free banking laws, but the
consequences of growing business opportunities. We will address this threat to identification in sections IV,
V and VII.
B. Bank Regulation in the US between 1837 and 1863
During the free banking period, US states were not concerned about systemic stability (see Mitchener and
Jaremski, 2012). This is a notable difference from modern financial systems, where banks can count on the
implicit guarantee of being rescued in case of default. Hence, the incentive of banks to take excessive risk
was presumably lower than nowadays, since banks were "free" to go bankrupt and exit the market. For these
reasons, we believe that the US free banking period is an ideal setup to study how the relaxation of bank
entry barriers affects bank competition and bank exit.
11Bodenhorn claims that the case of William Morgan, a Freemason who was kidnapped and disappeared after threatening to
reveal the secrets of Freemasonry, unleashed a political movement that became increasingly critical against the dominant class.
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Even though systemic stability was not among the objectives of bank regulators, the fact that banks in
some states set up private cooperative arrangements might be a concern for our study. These arrangements
represented a form of coinsurance among banks in times of financial distress. Hence, bank failures might be
the result of excessive risk taking fueled by coinsurance rather than bank competition.12 Nevertheless, we
argue that there are reasons to believe that private arrangements generate less severe distortions to bank
incentives than public safety nets.
First, this hypothesis is consistent with Gorton and Huang (2002)’s analysis of the origins of central
banking, which is based on the assumption that the regulator is worse than banks at monitoring.13 If this is
the case, it follows that banks’ incentives to take risk will be stronger under a system of public safety nets.
Second, Calomiris and Kahn (1996) argue that banks could participate to a private cooperative arrangement
only if they complied with a set of rules, which aimed at limiting moral hazard. Third, Calomiris and Kahn
(1996) also maintain that a bank could be expelled from a private cooperative arrangement if its behavior
represented a threat for the reputation of the coalition. It follows that the competitive distortions generated
by private arrangements were likely to be minor, because insolvent banks were not rescued and allowed
to continue their business. Nonetheless, in the empirical analysis we control for the existence of private
cooperative arrangements.14
A further concern is that states introduced other regulatory measures at the same time as free banking
laws. As long as these measures could influence bank competition and economic growth, our estimates of
the effect of free banking laws would be biased. There are a number of laws and institutional arrangements
that could represent a threat to our identification strategy. These include:
(a) Usury Laws: During the 19th century, US states had usury laws which imposed a ceiling on the interest
rate a bank could charge to a borrower.15 If states that introduced free banking laws were also raising
12Examples of private cooperative arrangements were the Suffolk System, which was a clearing system of New England’s
banks, and the New York Safety Fund, which was an insurance fund for New York banks. Banks in Indiana, Iowa, Michigan,
and Vermont also set up forms of cooperative arrangements (see e.g. Weber, 2011b; Klebaner, 2005).
13The authors demonstrate that banks can effectively monitor each other, but have the incentives to do so only under the
threat of a panic. Panics have social cost that banks do not internalize. Hence, in spite of being a worse monitor than banks,
a regulator finds it optimal to provide public debt insurance if the social costs of panics are large.
14We construct a binary variable which equals one if a state had a liability insurance system in a given year. Since the Suffolk
System was a regional clearing system operating only in New England, we control for it by adding region-by-year fixed effects
to our estimating equation. Note that in some states only certain types of banks (e.g. in Ohio and Indiana state banks and
their branches) were members of the insurance system. Other states (e.g. Vermont) required new chartered banks to join the
system, but decided later on to base membership on a voluntarily basis. We refer to Weber (2011b) for more details about the
antebellum liability insurance systems.
15Rockoff (2003) provides a detailed examination of the economic history of usury laws in the United States. For a study of
the political economy of US state usury laws we refer to Benmelech and Moskowitz (2010).
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the interest rate ceiling, our results might be biased. The reason is that a higher ceiling allows banks to
serve a wider pool of borrowers, which makes bank entry more attractive but also increases credit risk.
To address this concern we collect the data reported in Holmes (1892) to control for the state-by-year
variation in usury laws.
(b) General Incorporation Laws: The evolution of the chartering policy for non-financial corporations resem-
bles that of banks. During the 19th century, US states gradually lifted barriers to entry for non-financial
corporations by introducing general incorporation laws. If states introduced general incorporation laws
besides free banking laws, our results could be biased. It might be that a wave of new firms spurred the
demand for credit, which made bank entry more profitable and incentivized banks to take more risk. To
address this threat we collect the data reported in Evans (1948) to control for the state-by-year variation
in general incorporation laws.
(c) Shareholders’ Liability : Prior to the Civil War, shareholders of US banks had either unlimited, double
or limited liability (Dewey, 1910). Legal differences in shareholders’ liability may have affected banks’
risk-taking incentives and the costs to establish a new bank (Grossman, 2001, 2007). A concern with
our study might be that the states introducing free banking laws also gave shareholders the privilege
of limited liability. To address this concern, we control for the state-by-year variation in shareholders’
liability laws using the data collected from Dewey (1910) and Knox (1903).
(d) Branch-Banking : Calomiris and Schweikart (1991) argue that the banking system in the US South was
more resilient than in the rest of the US, because it was structured as a network of bank branches.
This structure presumably deterred the creation of new banks, as the existing banks could establish new
branches in locations where no bank existed. This raises the concern that the states who retained the
state bank chartering policies were those where bank branching was allowed. To address this concern,
we use the information in Weber (2011a)’s database to construct an indicator variable which equals one
in the states and years in which branch banking existed.
(e) State-Owned Banks: Some US states established state-owned banks before the American Civil War.
One may argue that state-owned banks were relatively safe, since they were often financing governments’
investment in infrastructure and other public projects (Knox, 1903). It might also be that states imposed
higher barriers to bank entry in order to shield the state-owned banks from bank competition. Hence,
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our results could be biased if states retaining the traditional bank chartering policies were also those
establishing state-owned banks. To address this concern, we use the information in Weber (2011a)’s
database to construct an indicator variable which equals one in states and years in which a state-owned
banks existed.
(f) Suspensions of Convertibility : Suspending the convertibility of banknotes was a common measure to
stop a panic and prevent bank failures. If states that retained the traditional bank chartering policy
suspended convertibility in crisis periods, our evidence might not be driven by the introduction of free
banking laws. To address this concern, we control for the state-by-year variation in suspensions of
convertibility using the data contained in Jalil (2012).
C. The Finance-Growth Nexus in the US between 1837 and 1863
Economic historians have argued that the rapid growth over the 1837-1863 period was finance-led (see
Rousseau and Sylla, 2005). Sylla (1999) claims that the "Federalist Financial Revolution" promoted by the
Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, in the 1790s was crucial to the development of a financial
system that was able to finance firms’ investments and innovations. Economic historians have also recognized
a specific role of banks in the economic development of the antebellum US. For example, Bodenhorn (2000)
emphasizes the importance of US banks in the provision of means of payments, in the accumulation of
savings and in their efficient allocation. Bodenhorn (1999) demonstrates that banks encouraged invention
and financed industrial development. What emerges is a picture of banks performing what theory considers to
be their main functions. Hence, we believe that the US free banking period provides an excellent opportunity
to analyze the link between bank competition and economic growth following the relaxation of barriers to
bank entry.
Some typical banking practices in the free banking period might cast doubts on our study. First, it
might be that bank failures were due to mismanagement rather than economic fundamentals. Descriptive
statistics reveal that US antebellum banks financed roughly half of their (non risk-weighted) assets through
capital, while nowadays banks hold an amount of capital lower than 10% of their assets (Hanson, Kashyap,
and Stein, 2011). Moreover, the common practice in the antebellum period was to lend short-term, against
safe collateral, and, at least in the Northeast, mainly to bank insiders (see Lamoraux, 1994). Nonetheless,
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we believe that bank failures were too frequent to be attributable only to mismanagement and that banks
were actually exposed to risks. On the liability side, banks bore the risk of sudden withdrawals of funds by
their investors. The reason is that a consistent source of funds for US antebellum banks was represented by
banknotes, which entitled the holder to demand redemption in specie at any time (Gorton, 1999). On the
asset side, the practice of lending mainly to insiders or to local firms could have exposed banks to a high
default risk because of the lack of diversification.
Second, the personal nature of local credit markets in the US might raise concerns on the growth enhancing
role of banks during the free banking era. If loans were mainly granted to bank insiders, bank entry might
not have relaxed firms’ credit constraints. Lamoreaux and Glaisek (1993), however, find evidence that banks
were promoting economic growth by providing new firms the funds to finance their investment opportunities.
This evidence also provides support to our interpretation of the finding that incumbent banks who failed
were those growing more after the introduction of free banking laws.
III. Data
This section discusses the data we use to examine how the introduction of free banking laws affected bank
competition and economic growth at the county-level. The focus of our empirical analysis is on the period
from 1830 to 1860.16 We choose 1830 as starting year, that is seven years before the first state (Michigan)
introduced a free banking system, in order to have a sufficiently large pre-treatment window to implement
a difference in differences (DID) estimation. Choosing 1830 as starting point, we also avoid data availability
problems of earlier years.17 Our empirical analysis ends in 1860, the year before the outbreak of the American
Civil War. The 1861-1865 Civil War was an atypically large negative shock to the US economy that may
have affected the banking sector in an unusual way.
As customary in the banking literature, we consider counties as the unit of analysis. Scholars have often
used county-level data to study the impact of bank activities on economic outcomes (e.g Ashcraft, 2005;
Calomiris and Mason, 2003; Gilber and Kochin, 1998) and to analyze local banking markets (e.g. Berger,
Klapper, and Turk-Ariss, 2009; Black and Strahan, 2002; Huang, 2008). In the historical context, Bodenhorn
(2008) argues that banking in the free banking era was generally a local affair, both in legal and economic
16We exclude Washington D.C. from our sample, since it was a federal district.
17During the free banking era banks sent annual reports to the state authorities and the problem of missing data became less
problematic (see Jaremski, 2010).
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terms. He uses county-level data to study bank entry in the nineteenth century New York, Massachusetts
and Pennsylvania. Following Bodenhorn, we take the county as the appropriate unit of analysis to study the
effects of free banking laws on bank competition and real sector’s growth.
Our analysis builds on Warren Weber’s (2006, 2011a) collection of bank balance sheets and census of
state banks during the antebellum US. The census of state banks contains the location, name, the beginning
and ending dates of all banks that existed in the US from 1789 to 1861. Weber’s dataset also contains
information on the type of bank charter (i.e. free or state chartered banks) and whether banks failed, closed
or still existed in 1861. The balance sheets, that antebellum banks had to report to the US states’ banking
authorities, provide detailed information on banks’ assets and liabilities. We merge the census of state banks
with the bank balance sheet data, match the location of each bank to its corresponding county, and then
construct county aggregates. We use also Weber’s data set at the bank level to study the dynamic efficiency
gains in the banking market following the introduction of free banking laws (see Section VI.B).
For the real sector analysis we combine our banking dataset with the Inter-University Consortium for
Political and Social Research (ICPSR) 2896 data file (Haines, 2010). The ICPSR 2896 file contains detailed
decennial county-level data on demographic, economic, and social variables which were collected by the US
Bureau of the Census for the period 1790-2000.18 We use the Census data for the decades from 1830 to 1860
to investigate the link between free banking and economic growth in US counties.
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the variables that we use in our empirical analysis. We provide
a detailed description of these variables in the Appendix.
18See http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/02896 for more details.
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IV. Free Banking, Bank Competition and Bank Exit
A. Estimation Strategy
In this section we use a difference-in-differences approach (DID) to estimate how the introduction of free
banking laws affected bank competition and bank exit at the county level. Our measure of bank competition
is the share of new banks in county c at time t. The share of failed banks and the share of closed banks in
county c at time t are our measures of bank exit. Our estimation equation takes the following form:
yc,t = λc + λst+ λr,t + βFBs,t + ΓXc,t−1 + ΘLEGs,t + ΨtZc,1830 + Φt2Zc,1830 + c,t (1)
Our variable of interest is the free banking indicator, FBs,t, that takes the value one for all the years t
since state s introduced a free banking law. The county fixed effects, λc, capture any county specific time-
invariant factors, such as, geography and historical factors. The region-by-year fixed effects, λr,t, control for
any variation between US Census regions over time, such as, regional business cycles and growth trends,19
and λst captures a linear state specific time trend.
We include a set of lagged banking sector control, Xc,t−1, such as, the number of banks and the average
age of banks to control for the size and average experience of counties’ banking sector. We also add a set of
lagged bank balance sheet ratios, averaged at the county level, to the bank exit estimating equation. This
set includes the capital to assets, deposits to assets, circulation to assets, loans to assets, cash to assets,
and public bonds to assets ratios. These ratios control for banks’ asset and liability structure, which could
represent another source of risk besides the increased competition due to the introduction of free banking
laws.20
We further add the set of state-by-year varying legislation variables, LEGs,t, that we have described
in Section II, to make sure that our results are not driven by other laws than free banking. Following
Bodenhorn (2008), we also include a set of initial county observables, Zc,1830, interacted with a linear and
squared time trend. This set of observable variables include counties’ population size, the urbanization rate,
the manufacturing share, the commercial share, the number of banks per capita, and bank capital per capita.
19The US Census regions in our sample are: New England, Mid-Atlantic, Midwest and the South.
20We use the lag for the control variables, Xc,t−1, in order to mitigate the reverse causality concern.
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We add these covariates, Zc,1830, in order to mitigate the concern that the timing of states’ decision to adopt
free banking laws could be systematically related to county-level outcomes in 1830 (see also Section VII.A).
As a benchmark, we estimate equation (1) by least squares and, as a robustness check, by a heteroskedastic
fractional probit model (see Wooldridge, 2010). We cluster the error term, csr,t, at the state level to ensure
that the standard errors of our estimates are robust to arbitrary correlation across counties in each US
state. In Section VII we address further threats to identification, such as, pre-free banking differences in the
sample and anticipation effects, and we provide alternative estimation strategies to deal with unobserved
heterogeneity.
B. Results: Free Banking and Bank Competition
Table 3 shows the within-county level response of the share of new banks to the introduction of free banking
laws using estimating equation (1). The method of estimation is least squares. Column (1) reports the
results from regressing the share of new banks on the free banking indicator variable after controlling for
county fixed effects, region-by-year fixed effects and a linear state specific time trend. The coefficient on
the free banking indicator is positive and statistically significant at the 1-percent level. The point estimate
implies that introducing free banking is associated with an increase in the share of new banks by around 3.5
percentage points.
In column (2) of Table 3 we add the lagged number of banks and the lagged average age of banks to
the estimating equation. The coefficient on the free banking indicator remains positive and statistically
significant at the 1-percent level. The point estimate implies that, after controlling for the size and average
experience of county c’s banking sector, introducing free banking is associated with an increase in the share
of new banks by around 4 percentage points. In column (3), we include the legislation measures discussed
in Section 2 as additional controls. The coefficient on the free banking indicator variable remains positive
and statistically significant at the 1-percent level. This result is quite reassuring, since it confirms that our
positive effect is not driven by changes in other state laws that could also potentially affect bank entry.
The result in column (4) shows that there is still a positive effect of free banking laws on bank entry that
is statistically significant at the 1-percent level after controlling for a set of initial county observables (see
Section IV.A for details). The point estimate implies that the introduction of free banking laws is associated
with an increase in the rate of bank entry by around 3.25 percentage points.
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Since the share of new banks is a fractional response variable, which is bounded between zero and
one by definition, our least square estimates provide only an approximation. It might well be that the
predicted share of new banks is outside the unit interval. To address this problem we follow the suggestion of
Wooldridge (2010) and estimate a heteroskedastic fractional probit model adjusted to deal with unobserved
heterogeneity in an unbalanced panel.21 Appendix Table 1 shows the results. The point estimates are
statistically significant at the conventional levels and quantitatively larger than the least square estimates.
Our estimates indicate that the share of new banks increases by up to 8 percentage points following the
introduction of free banking laws.
Our results on bank entry are in line with the empirical evidence in Economopoulos and O’Neill (1995)
and Bodenhorn (2008), who suggest that free banking laws led to more bank entry. Since the mean share of
new banks for the entire sample is 9.38%, our least squares estimates represent an increase ranging between
34.75% and 42.8% relative the unconditional mean. Hence, we find evidence of an economically significant
impact of free banking laws on bank competition.
C. Results: Free Banking and Bank Exit
Table 4 reports the effect of introducing free banking laws on bank exit using estimating equation (1). The
method of estimation is least squares. Columns (1)-(4) contain the results on the share of failed banks,
while columns (5)-(8) show the estimates for the share of closed banks. Column (1) shows the results from
regressing the share of failed banks on the free banking indicator variable after controlling for county fixed
effects, region-by-year fixed effects and a linear state specific time trend. The result is a positive coefficient on
the free banking indicator variable that is statistically significant at the 1-percent level. The point estimate
implies that introducing free banking is associated with an increase in the share of failed banks by more than
2 percentage points.
In column (2) of Table 4 we add to our estimating equation the lagged number of banks, the lagged
average age of banks, and the lagged balance sheet ratios mentioned in Section IV.A.22 The coefficient on
the free banking indicator increases slightly and remains statistically significant at the 1-percent level. The
point estimate implies that, after adding the set of lagged banking sector controls, introducing free banking
21We describe the estimation approach for the heteroskedastic fractional probit model in Appendix Table 1; for more details
see Wooldridge (2010).
22Note, that there is a drop of observations, because we do not have information on the balance sheet controls available for
all counties in the sample. This drop in observations does not change our result, qualitatively.
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laws is associated with an increase in the share of failed banks by around 2.5 percentage points. In column
(3), we include the legislation measures discussed in Section 2 as additional controls. We still find a positive
coefficient on the free banking indicator variable, which is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This
confirms that our results are not driven by changes in other state laws that could also potentially affect bank
failures. Column (4) presents the results after controlling for the set of initial county observables mentioned
in Section IV.A. The effect of free banking laws on the share of failed banks remains positive and statistically
significant at the 5-percent level. The point estimate implies that the introduction of free banking laws is
associated with an increase in the share of failed banks by up to 3 percentage points.
Appendix Table 2 presents the results for the share of failed banks using, as in Section IV.B, a heteroske-
datic fractional probit model. The estimated coefficient on the free banking indicator variable is positive
and statistically significant at the conventional levels in three out of four specifications. The point estimates
are quantitatively a bit larger compared to the least squares estimates and indicate that the share of failed
banks increased up to 3.5 percentage points after states decided to introduce free banking laws.
Overall, we provide evidence that counties in states that introduced free banking laws experienced more
bank failures. The estimated effect is quite strong, as our least squares estimates correspond to an increase
up to 155.5% relative to the unconditional mean. As the absence of state-implicit guarantees allows us to
rule out the confounding effect of moral hazard on risk taking, this finding provides new evidence in support
of the competition-instability view (see e.g. Marcus, 1984; Chan, Greenbaum, and Thakor, 1986; Keeley,
1990), which claims that a more competitive banking sector leads to a higher probability of bank failure.
As long as these additional banks failing were free banks, our finding is also consistent with the strand of
literature showing that free banks had a significantly higher probability of failure than state-chartered banks
(e.g. Rolnick and Weber, 1984, 1985; Economopoulos, 1990; Jaremski, 2010).
Columns (5)-(8) report the results of the same exercise as in columns (1)-(4), but using the share of closed
banks as dependent variable. We do not find any robust and statistically significant association between the
introduction of free banking laws and the share of bank closures. Even if there is no statistically significant
effect at the county level, the type of banks that decided to close their business after states introduced
free banking laws could differ fundamentally. We investigate this hypothesis in Section VI.B, where we use
bank-level data to test whether the introduction of free banking laws affected the probability of closure of
incumbent banks.
16
Our evidence on bank competition and bank failures raises the question whether the introduction of free
banking laws yielded a net benefit for the real sector. The entry of new banks in a market has presumably
beneficial effects for the real sector, as the credit supply increases and firms have stronger incentives to un-
dertake investment opportunities. On the other hand, bank failures could lead to sharp contractions in the
credit supply, which negatively affects output as firms might become unable to access external finance. To
investigate which of these two effects dominate, we investigate whether free banking laws spurred economic
growth over the decades 1830 to 1860.
V. Free Banking and Economic Growth
A. Estimation Strategy
In this section we investigate the link between the introduction of free banking laws and counties’ real sector
performance over the decades 1830 to 1860. Our preferred county-level measure of real sector performance
is output per capita in logarithmic units. In order to shed light on the changes in the sectoral composition of
output and in capital accumulation following the introduction of free banking laws, we also examine counties’
agricultural and manufacturing output and manufacturing capital. More formally, we regress our outcome
variable in county c at time t, yc,t, on a free banking indicator variable, FBs,t−1, that equals one if state s
had introduced free banking laws in t− 1.
Regressing output per capita, yc,t, on a lagged free banking indicator, FBs,t−1, is well suited to circumvent
potential reverse causality concerns that higher output per capita levels could lead to the introduction of
free banking laws. Hence, we are able to capture the existence of a lagged effect between the introduction
of free banking laws and its impact on real sector performance. The estimating equation takes the following
form:
yc,t = λc + λst+ λt + βFBs,t−1 + ΓXc,t−1 + ΘLEGs,t−1 + c,t (2)
Our method of estimation is least squares. The county fixed effects, λc, account for counties’ long-run
steady state characteristics. The year fixed effects, λt wipe out any nationwide time varying unobserved
17
heterogeneity, such as national business cycles, that could otherwise confound our findings. The linear state
specific time trend, λst, allows for linear unobserved heterogeneity across states in the time trend of output
per capita. We add a set of control variables, Xc,t−1, such as counties’ urbanization rate, population size,
the manufacturing share, the agricultural share, the share of blacks, the labor force participation rate, the
number of banks and assets per capita to account for cross-county differences in t− 1. In order to rule out
the confounding effect of other state laws, we also control for the state-by-year varying legislation variables,
LEGs,t−1, discussed in Section II. We cluster the error term, csr,t, at the state level to ensure that the
computed standard errors of our estimates are robust to arbitrary correlation across counties in each US
state.
As an alternative model specification, we estimate equation (2) in first differences. After differencing out
time-invariant heterogeneity across counties (λc), controlling for a linear time trend of output per capita
across states, αst, and year fixed effects, λt, in the level-form representation, our first-difference estimation
equation takes the following form:
∆yc,t = αs + ∆λt + β∆FBs,t−1 + Γ∆Xc,t−1 + Θ∆LEGs,t−1 + ∆c,t (3)
In equation (3), the β coefficient represents the effect of the introduction of free banking laws between t− 2
and t − 1 on output growth between t − 1 and t. Our identification strategy relies on the assumption that
changes in the explanatory variables (FBs,t−1, Xc,t−1, LEGs,t−1) are not correlated with changes in the
error term. The error term, ∆c,t, is clustered at the state level to ensure that the computed standard errors
of our estimates are robust to arbitrary correlation across counties in each US state. Estimating equation (2)
in first differences has the advantage that we are able to add county fixed effects, αc, to our first-difference
estimating equation, which account for a county specific linear trend in the level of output per capita.23
As further robustness checks, we show in Section VII that the timing of free banking is not systematically
related to initial county-level outcomes in 1830, and we provide alternative estimation strategies to deal with
the concern of unobserved heterogeneity.
23Note that the time-invariant county fixed effects of equation (2), λc, drop out by taking first differences.
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B. Results
Table 5 contains our results on the link between introducing a free banking system in t− 1 and output per
capita in t. Our estimating equation is based on (2) for columns (1)-(3), and on (3) for columns (4)-(6). The
method of estimation is least squares. Column (1) reports the results from regressing the log of output per
capita in t on a free banking indicator in t − 1 after controlling for county fixed effects, year fixed effects,
a state-specific linear time trend and the set of control variables, Xc,t−1, mentioned in Section V.A. The
link between the free banking indicator and output per capita is positive and statistically significant at the
1-percent level. The point estimate implies that states that introduced free banking laws in t−1 experienced
in t an increase in output per capita by around 14 percent.
In column (2) of Table 5, we add the set of state-by-year varying legislation variables, LEGs,t−1, to our
estimating equation (see Section II for details). The link between free banking laws and output per capita
remains positive and statistically significant at the 5-percent level. This result indicates that free banking
laws have a growth-enhancing effect which goes beyond the effect of other state laws that could influence
output per capita. Column (3) shows the results when we include region-by-year fixed effects, λr,t, to our
estimating equation. The coefficient on the free banking variable increases slightly and remains statistically
significant at the 1-percent level. The point estimate implies that states that had a free banking system in
t− 1 experienced an increase in output per capita in t by more than 25 percent.
Columns (4) and (5) report the first difference estimates of the level-form specification used in columns
(1) and (2). The link between the lagged change in free banking, ∆FBs,t−1, and changes in output per
capita, ∆yc,t, is positive and statistically significant at the 5-percent level. The point estimate in column (4)
implies that counties’ output growth would increase by roughly 14 percent if a state introduced free banking
laws in the previous decade. When we add the changes in other state laws, ∆LEGs,t−1, in column (5) the
size of the estimated coefficient on free banking increases slightly, and remains statistically significant at the
5-percent level.
Column (6) presents our preferred specification, where we add region-by-year effects, ∆λr,t, and county
fixed effects, αc to estimating equation (3). The estimated coefficient on free banking increases not only
in its size, but also becomes statistically significant at the 1-percent level. The point estimate implies that
counties’ output growth would increase up to 22 percent if a state introduced free banking laws in the
previous decade. Put it differently, the yearly output growth during the 1830-1860 period would be about 2
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percent higher following the introduction of free banking.24
Table 6 presents the results on the sectoral composition of output and on capital accumulation in the
manufacturing sector. We use the same specifications as in Table 5. The method of estimation is least
squares. Panel A of Table 6 presents the results on manufacturing output per capita. The coefficient on
the free banking indicator is positive and statistically significant at the 1-percent level in four out of six
specifications. The point estimates imply that counties’ manufacturing output per capita increased between
33 and 52 percent in the states that had introduced free banking laws in the previous decade. Panel B of
Table 6 reports the results on agricultural output per capita. The coefficient on the free banking indicator
is positive and statistically significant at the conventional levels in four out of six specifications. The point
estimates imply that counties’ agricultural output per capita increased by around 20 percent in the states
that had introduced free banking laws in the previous decade. Panel C of Table 6 presents the results on
manufacturing capital per capita. The link between free banking laws and manufacturing capital is positive
and statistically significant at the 1-percent level. The point estimates imply that counties’ manufacturing
capital increased between 23 and 32 percent in states that had introduced free banking laws in the previous
decade.
Overall, our empirical evidence suggests that the introduction of free banking laws may have spurred
economic growth over the decades 1830 to 1860. Broadly speaking, our results are in line with the large
literature on the finance-growth nexus that has argued that finance led growth (e.g. King and Levine, 1993;
Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996). Our findings resonate with Rousseau and Sylla
(2005)’s view that finance led growth in the US before the American Civil War, and suggest that the
introduction of free banking laws may have significantly contributed to the rapid industrialization process
over the course of that period.25
Our findings indicate that the increased bank competition following the introduction of free banking laws
had overall beneficial effects in spite of the more frequent bank failures during the 1830 to 1860 period. We
interpret this evidence along the lines of Rancière, Tornell, and Westermann (2008), who show that countries
experiencing occasional financial crises grow more in the long run. We point out that our results do not allow
24We note that our results are qualitatively in line with Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), who find annual growth rates to
increase by 0.51 to 1.19 percentage points following intrastate branch deregulation in the US during the late 20th century.
25We note that our objective is to analyze the economic consequences of free banking laws rather than investigating the
effect of (free) banks on economic growth per se. Our results are therefore not at odds with Jaremski and Rousseau (2012)’s
county-level study on the link between banks and economic growth during the free banking era.
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us to conclude that the costs of bank failures in terms of output growth were negligible, but they suggest
that bank competition might be beneficial in the long run. In the next section, we examine two channels
through which this beneficial effect might have operated: Financial development, and dynamic efficiency
gains in the banking market.
VI. Channels
A. Financial Development
In this subsection, we investigate the hypothesis that free banking laws spurred economic growth by enhancing
financial development. To measure financial development in the US over the decades 1830 to 1860, we use
loans per capita, as suggested by Bodenhorn (2000), and the real money stock per capita, as suggested by
Rousseau and Sylla (2005). We use the same right-hand-side variables as in the previous section, but further
add lagged output per capita to the set of control variables, Xc,t−1. The estimating equation is based on (2)
in columns (1)-(3) , and on (3) in columns (4)-(6). The method of estimation is least squares.
Table 7 contains our county-level results on the link between free banking laws in t − 1 and financial
development in t. Panel A of Table 7 presents the results on loans per capita. The estimated coefficient on
free banking is positive and at least statistically significant at the 5-percent level. The point estimates imply
that loans per capita increased by around 4 percentage points following the introduction of free banking laws
in the previous decade. This corresponds to a 61.7% increase relative to the mean loans per capita for the
entire sample. In Panel B of Table 7 we report the estimates of the link between the introduction of free
banking laws and the real money stock per capita. The coefficient on the free banking indicator is positive
and statistically significant at the 1-percent level in five out of six specifications. The point estimates imply
that county c’s money stock increases by 2 to 6 percentage points following the introduction of free banking
laws in the previous decade. These effects represent a 50% to 150% increase relative to the mean money
stock per capita for the entire sample.
Our empirical evidence suggests that the growth-enhancing effect of introducing free banking laws may
have worked through the financial development channel. The fiercer bank competition after states introduced
free banking laws might have led banks to expand their supply of loans and money, which allowed new or
previously credit-constrained firms to finance their investment opportunities.
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B. Dynamic Efficiency
In this subsection we examine whether the introduction of free banking laws led to efficiency gains in the
banking market. In particular, we investigate how the relative performance of banks changed following the
introduction of free banking laws. To address this question, we need to focus on individual banks that existed
before the introduction of free banking laws (i.e. incumbent banks), and rank them according to a measure
of efficiency. In the remainder of this section, we first put forward our estimation strategy and then show
the results.
B.1 Hypothesis and Estimation Strategy
We test for efficiency gains in the banking market following two steps. As a first step, we examine how the
introduction of free banking laws affected the probability of failure and closure of incumbent banks. One
would expect incumbent banks to become more likely to close if more efficient banks entered the market after
the barriers to bank entry were lifted. It could also be argued that the higher degree of bank competition
following the introduction of free banking laws led incumbents to take more risk and hence increased their
likelihood to default. On the other hand, incumbent banks might become more efficient, and thus less likely
to fail or close, in order to prevent other banks from entering the market.
To test which of these two effects dominate, we estimate the following model:
yi,t = αi + λt + βFBs,t + ΓXi,t−1 + ΘBanksc,t−1 + i,t (4)
The dependent variables, yi,t, are two dummy variables: One dummy variable captures whether an incumbent
bank failed, the other whether an incumbent bank closed at time t. Our variable of interest is the free banking
indicator variable, FBs,t. We control for bank time-invariant characteristics, αi, lagged bank-level balance
sheet ratios and banks’ age, Xi,t−1, the number of banks in each county, Banksc,t−1, and include year fixed
effects, λt. We restrict the sample to incumbent banks, which we define as the banks existing at least four
years before the introduction of free banking laws.26 For the states that never introduced free banking laws,
we define as incumbents all the banks that existed during our sample period, as the level of competition in
26We also check the robustness of our results to other definitions of incumbent banks. In particular, we consider as incumbents
banks that existed three and five years before the introduction of free banking laws. These alternative definitions of incumbents
do not significantly change our results.
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those banking markets was likely to be the same at any point in time.
As a second step, we examine the effect of free banking laws on the relative performance of incumbent
banks. Ideally, we would like to perform an exercise in the spirit of Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) and rank
incumbent banks on the basis of an efficiency measure. Unfortunately, we cannot use the same measures
as Jayaratne and Strahan (1998), because of data limitations.27 Our choice is to rank incumbent banks
according to whether they failed, closed, or survived during our sample period.
During the free banking period, banks closed down their business either because their charter was repealed
by the state, because of the violation of some state banking laws, or a voluntary choice by their shareholders
(see e.g. Knox, 1903; Dewey, 1910). We believe these three cases are signals of banks’ inefficiency and
low profitability, which might have led shareholders not to comply with state laws in order to gamble
for resurrection, or to take the decision to interrupt banks’ activities. By contrast, bank failures did not
necessarily occur because of inefficiency. Most likely, they were caused by an increase in risk taking together
with lack of diversification or a negative systemic shock. Hence, we formulate the following hypothesis:
(a) The introduction of free banking laws led incumbent banks that closed during our sample period to grow
less than their counterparts.
(b) The introduction of free banking laws led incumbent banks that failed during our sample period to grow
more than their counterparts.
We test the relative performance of incumbent banks using the following specification:
yi,t = αi + λt + β1FBs,t + β2FBs,t × Failedi + β3FBs,t × Closedi + ΓXi,t−1 + ΘBanksc,t−1 + i,t (5)
We consider the yearly growth rate of incumbents’ assets and the yearly growth rate of incumbents’ market
share as outcome variables. In addition to the control variables in equation (4), we include an interaction
term between FBs,t and Failedi, and between FBs,t and Closedi. Failedi and Closedi are dummies that
equal one if a bank failed or closed during our sample period, respectively.28 We are interested in the free
banking indicator and its interaction terms, which capture the marginal effect of free banking laws on the
27We do not have data on charge offs, loan loss provisions, and non performing loans. We have information on profits, but
only net of dividends. Hence, we are not able to identify whether a bank had low profits because it was inefficient or distributed
high dividends.
28Note that the Failedi and Closedi dummies are time-invariant and absorbed by the bank fixed effects.
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banks who failed or closed during our sample period. As for estimating equation (4), we restrict the sample
to incumbent banks.
B.2 Results
Table 8 presents the least squares estimates of equation (4). We find that the introduction of free banking
laws reduced the probability of closure of incumbent banks by roughly 0.7 percentage points, but did not
significantly affect their probability of failure. Relative to the sample mean, the reduction in the probability
of closure equals 38.6%. Appendix Table 3 shows the results from estimating equation (4) using a het-
eroscedastic probit model (see Wooldridge, 2010). The probit model confirms the negative and statistically
significant coefficient on the probability of closure.29 As long as the banks that closed were the least efficient
ones, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that incumbent banks became more efficient after the
introduction of free banking laws.
In column (1) of Table 9 we present the least squares estimates of equation (5) for the asset growth of
incumbent banks. The estimated coefficient on the free banking indicator variable is negative and statisti-
cally significant at the 5-percent level. We find that, after the introduction of free banking laws, incumbent
banks that closed grew roughly 10 percentage points less than surviving banks. The overall effect of free
banking laws on asset growth of incumbent banks that closed (i.e. β1 + β3) roughly equals -10 percentage
points and is statistically significant at the 1-percent level. There is no statistically significant difference in
the asset growth of banks who failed, but free banking had an overall positive and statistically significant
effect on the asset growth of these banks (i.e. β1 + β2), which increased by roughly 3 percentage points.
The growth rate of incumbents’ market share provides additional insights on the evolution of the banking
sector. Column (2) of Table 9 shows that the interaction and overall effects of free banking laws are negative
for the incumbent banks who closed, and positive for the incumbent banks who failed. The point estimates
are statistically significant at the conventional levels.30 Our evidence suggests that free banking laws reduced
the growth rate of incumbents closing during our sample period, both in absolute terms and relative to the
market. The effect on the failing incumbents is the opposite, while those on the surviving incumbents is not
statistically significant.
29We now find also a positive and statistically significant effect of free banking on the probability of failure.
30These results continue to hold if we define banks that existed three or five years before the introduction of free banking
laws as incumbents, respectively.
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Our findings point to a redistribution effect of free banking laws. Banks who failed gained market share
at the expense of those who closed during our sample period, while the surviving banks did not benefit nor
lose from the introduction of free banking laws. As long as the banks who closed were the least efficient
ones, we can conclude that this redistribution effect led to efficiency gains if the failed incumbent banks were
making the most productive use of funds. This would be a difficult argument to defend if bank failures were
due to poor lending practices or mismanagement.
However, in Section II, we argued that these were not the most likely causes of bank failure, because of
the high capital ratios banks had at that time. It might well be that incumbent banks failed even though
they were financing productive firms. We interpret our findings along the lines of Rancière, Tornell, and
Westermann (2008) and argue that the introduction of free banking laws increased the competitive pressure,
which led incumbent banks to lend to new or previously credit constrained firms. As a result, aggregate
investment and economic activity increased, as well as banks’ credit risk. The increased credit risk led to a
greater fragility and might explain the evidence that the incumbent banks failing were those growing more.
VII. Robustness
A. Pre-Free Banking Differences in the Sample
In this subsection, we test whether the introduction of free banking laws was systematically related to
county-level outcomes in 1830. We construct three dummy variables. The first dummy captures whether a
state adopted free banking laws during the "first free banking wave" (1837-1838). The second dummy cap-
tures whether a state adopted free banking laws either during the "first free banking wave" or the "second
free banking wave" (1849-1853). The third dummy captures whether a state ever introduced free banking
laws during the 1830 to 1860 period. We regress the county-level outcomes in 1830 on each of the dummy
variables (see Table 10 for more details). Ideally, we should find that none of the dummy variables have an
explanatory power for any of the county-level outcomes in 1830.
Table 10, Panel A, shows the results on the link between county-level outcomes in 1830 and states adopt-
ing free banking laws during the "first wave" of free banking. All county-level outcomes in 1830 except loans
per capita are statistically insignificant. The results for the "first and second wave" of free banking in Panel
B of Table 10 are qualitatively the same. Reassuringly, the timing of free banking does not seem to be driven
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by county-level differences in outcomes in 1830. The significant difference in loans per capita suggests that
the "early" free banking states, on average, were less financially developed in 1830. This finding reveals that
the states that adopted free banking laws earlier were not the most economically and financially developed,
but it confirms our concern that the inadequate supply of credit may have influenced the decision to relax
the barriers to bank entry. However, we believe that the identification strategy in Section IV and V, and the
robustness checks in the remainder of this section, can address this concern.
Panel C of Table 10 presents the results on whether states that ever implemented a free banking system
systematically differed in county-level outcomes in 1830. The only significant effects are those on the manu-
facturing, commercial and agricultural shares. The point estimates suggest that the states that introduced
free banking laws were generally those with a more developed industrial and commercial sector than the
states who retained the state-chartering policy. To account for these pre-free banking differences, we control
for the initial manufacturing and commercial share interacted with a linear and squared time trend in the
bank entry and exit analysis of Section IV, while we include these shares as lagged control variables in the
growth regression of Section V.
B. Anticipation Effects
A major concern when using a DID approach is that anticipation effects could drive the results. If banks
change their behavior anticipating the regulatory change, or in case there are any differences between the
treatment and control group prior to the regulatory change, our estimated effects would not be driven by the
introduction of free banking laws. To address this concern, we estimate a dynamic specification of equation
(1), where we include five leads and lags of the free banking indicator. We test the significance of the
cumulative sum of the coefficients,
∑T
k=−5 βk, in order to examine whether anticipation effects contaminate
our findings. We use the following estimating equation:
yc,t = λc + λst+ λr,t +
5∑
k=−5
βkFBs,t + ΓXc,t−1 + ΘLEGs,t + ΨtZc,1830 + Φt2Zc,1830 + c,t (6)
Figure 1 and 2 show the cumulative sum of the effects of free banking laws on the share of new and failed
banks. The cumulative effect of the free banking laws on the share of new banks shows no pre-existing
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trend, but displays a 4.6 percentage point increase in the year when states introduced free banking laws.
The cumulative effect on the share of failed banks is qualitatively similar. Also for this variable, there is no
pre-existing trend, but a 6.4 percentage point increase in the year following the introduction of free banking
laws. Overall, our evidence indicates that the estimated effect of free banking laws is not driven by any
anticipation effects.
C. Border-Counties: A Regression Discontinuity Design
The state-by-year variation in the introduction of free banking laws together with the federal structure of
the US, allows us to use a regression discontinuity design. Following Holmes (1998)’s identification strategy,
we restrict the sample to contiguous counties lying on the border of states that passed a free banking law
at different points in time.31 This approach facilitates the identification of the effect of free banking laws,
because geographically close counties are more likely to be similar in terms of unobservables, such as, growth
trends and economic shocks.
The estimation strategy, which we call border-county approach, follows closely the regression discontinuity
design of Black (1999). We estimate the following equation:
ycb,t = λc + λbt+ λst+ λt + βFBs,t + ΓXcb,t−1 + ΘLEGs,t + ΨtZcb,1830 + cb,t (7)
The important difference to equation (1) is the inclusion of a border segment specific linear trend, λbt,
which captures any unobserved heterogeneity across border segments in the linear time trend of the outcome
variable, ycb,t. Our identifying assumption is that any within-border segment difference in the treatment is
uncorrelated with the within-border segment difference in the error term, that is E(FBs,t, cb,t) = 0. We
use two-dimensional clustering to account for within-state over time and within-border segment over time
correlations.32
Table 11, Panel A, presents the within-county level response of the share of new banks to the introduction
31Other studies that exploit policy discontinuities at the state border to investigate how regulatory changes affect bank
performance are Huang (2008) and Danisewicz, McGowan, Onali, and Schaek (2013) for example.
32Note that with the border-county approach the same county can be in multiple pairs. We do not include counties multiple
times, but choose the selection of the county into its corresponding border segment randomly to preserve the panel structure
of the sample. Allowing counties to be included multiple times would not affect our findings qualitatively.
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of free banking laws using estimating equation (7). The method of estimation is least squares. As in Section
IV.B, we find that introducing free banking laws led to a significantly higher share of new banks. The point
estimates are positive, statistically significant and qualitatively similar to the estimates reported in Table 3.
In Table 11, Panel B, we repeat the estimation for the share of failed banks using estimating equation (7).
As in Section IV.C, we find that introducing free banking laws led to a significantly higher share of failed
banks, even though the estimated effect of the introduction of free banking laws is slightly smaller.
We also use the border-county approach to improve the identification of the effect of free banking laws on
output per capita. We add a border segment specific linear trend to estimating equation (2) and add border
segment fixed effects to the first differences equation (3). Table 12 presents the results. The estimating
equation is based on (2) in columns (1)-(3), and on (3) in columns (4)-(6). The method of estimation is least
squares. The link between free banking laws and output per capita is positive and statistically significant at
the 1-percent level. The point estimates range between 16 to 41 percent, and thus are quantitatively a bit
larger than the point estimates reported in Table 5. Overall, the border-county approach confirms our main
results of Section IV and V, and mitigates the concern that unobservables could drive our main findings.
D. Selection Effect on Unobservables
In this subsection we perform an exercise in the spirit of Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) to assess the size
of the omitted variable bias. Altonji, Elder and Taber provide a measure of this bias assuming that selection
on observables can be used to assess the size of the selection on unobservables.
We follow Bellows and Miguel (2008)’s approach to construct Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005)’s measure.
We consider two regressions: One with a restricted set of control variables, and one with a full set of controls.
We obtain the coefficients on the free banking indicator variable and calculate the ratio βˆ
u
βˆr−βˆu , where βˆ
r
(βˆu) is the coefficient obtained from the (un)restricted regression. This measure indicates how much stronger
selection on unobservables, relative to selection on observables, must be to explain away the full estimated
effect. The intuition is that, if selection on observables can be used to assess selection on unobservables, we
should be concerned about the omitted variable bias if including observable controls substantially changes
the coefficient on the variable of interest. Hence, the lower the absolute value of the ratio, the greater the
size of the bias from unobservables.
We calculate this ratio for our bank competition, bank exit and economic growth variables. The unre-
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stricted specification includes the full set of controls, while the restricted specification only the controls listed
in the specification shown in the first column of the results on each outcome variable. All the ratios, but the
one on the share of new banks, are negative.33 Given our estimated βˆu coefficients are positive, a negative
ratio can only be obtained when the coefficient on free banking increases after we control for observables.
Under the assumption that observables and unobservables are positively correlated, a negative ratio indicates
that our coefficient on free banking is downward biased. Hence, the omitted variable bias does not seem to be
a major concern. As regards the share of new banks, the ratio is roughly equal to sixteen. This means that
selection on unobservables must be greater than selection on observables by a factor of sixteen to explain
away the full estimated effect of free banking. Taken together with the evidence of the previous subsections,
we believe that it is quite unlikely that unobserved heterogeneity drives our main results.
VIII. Conclusion
We have investigated how the introduction of free banking laws in the US between 1837 and 1863 affected
bank competition and economic growth. With the introduction of free banking laws, governments gave up
their power over bank chartering and allowed any individual to establish a bank provided that certain legal
requirements were satisfied. This change in bank-chartering policy, together with the fact that systemic
stability was not among the objectives of bank regulators at that time, makes the free banking period an
ideal setup to study long-standing questions like the effect of higher bank competition on economic growth.
Compared to studies based on contemporary data, a major advantage is that we are able to isolate the effects
of bank competition from those of state implicit guarantees.
We have shown that the introduction of free banking laws significantly increased bank competition,
as measured by the share of new banks, and led to more bank failures in US counties. This evidence is
consistent with a strand of literature maintaining that fiercer bank competition increases the probability of
bank failures. Our results also indicate a growth-enhancing effect of free banking laws, since output per
capita turns out to be significantly higher in counties where free banking laws were introduced. Our results
suggest that the growth-enhancing effect of free banking laws is consistent with two explanations. First, bank
competition promoted counties’ financial development, as measured by loans per capita and money stock
33The ratios can be easily calculated using the coefficients shown in Tables 3-7. The restricted coefficient is the one shown in
the column with the least controls, while the unrestricted coefficient is the one shown in the column with the full set of controls.
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per capita. Second, bank competition determined efficiency gains in the banking industry. In particular, our
estimates show that free banking laws decreased the probability of closure of incumbent banks, and led the
inefficient incumbent banks to grow less than their more efficient counterparts. These findings are consistent
with the literature on the finance-growth nexus, which argues that finance led growth.
An interesting implication of our empirical evidence is that, in a banking system without public safety
nets, more frequent bank failures do not harm economic growth in the long run. We cannot infer from
this finding that bank failures were costless, nor do we claim that removing public safety nets would be a
Pareto-improvement. We do believe, however, that this result might provide some guidance to regulators on
the reform process that has started in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. A lot of effort has been
directed to addressing the "too-big-to-fail" problem and avoiding the use of taxpayers’ money to rescue ailing
banks.34 As a result, the future banking system will probably suffer less from the distortions engendered
by public safety nets and, in this sense, will become more similar to a "free-banking system". In order to
have a banking system that stimulates economic growth, however, it is crucial to make additional efforts
in promoting competition among banks. These efforts should be directed both to the resolution of banks
in financial distress, which might hinder the growth of healthier banks, and to limit the risk of excessive
concentration of banking activities, especially in those countries where a consolidation process took place in
the aftermath of the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
34For example, bank living wills and the ring-fencing of banking activities aim at resolving banks’ distress in a more efficient
way. Requiring banks to hold "bailinable" debt will guarantee the use of taxpayers’ money only after forcing losses on bank
creditors.
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Appendix: Data Appendix
VARIABLE Interval DESCRIPTION
Share of New Banks Yearly
Fraction of newly established banks out of the total number of
banks in each county (Source: Weber, 2006).
Share of Failed Banks Yearly
Fraction of failed banks out of the total number of banks in each
county (Source: Weber, 2006).
Share of Closed Banks Yearly
Fraction of closed banks out of the total number of banks in each
county (Source: Weber, 2006).
Output per capita Decennial
Total output is the sum of manufacturing and agricultural output
in per capita terms at the county level (Source: ICPSR 2896 file).
Manufacturing Output per
capita
Decennial
We calculate manufacturing output at the county level as the dif-
ference between manufacturing output and the cost of materials
used in manufacturing (Source: ICPSR 2896 file). We had to
impute manufacturing output for the year 1830 because no man-
ufacturing data were reported in the 1830 Census at the county
level. See the ICPSR 2896 codebook for more details.
Agricultural Output per
capita
Decennial
Agricultural output per capita at the county level (Source: ICPSR
2896 file). We had to impute agricultural output for the year 1830
because no agricultural data were reported in the 1830 Census at
the county level. See the ICPSR 2896 codebook for more details.
Manufacturing Capital per
capita
Decennial
Manufacturing capital per capita at the county level (Source:
ICPSR 2896 file). We had to impute manufacturing capital for
the year 1830 because no manufacturing data were reported in
the 1830 Census at the county level. See the ICPSR 2896 code-
book for more details.
Loans per capita Decennial
Real bank loans (in terms of 1830 US Dollars) divided by popula-
tion (excluding slaves) at the county level (Source: Weber, 2011a).
Real Money Stock per
capita
Decennial
Sum of real bank deposits and circulation (in terms of 1830 US
Dollars) divided by population (excluding slaves) at the county
level (Source: Weber, 2011a).
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VARIABLE Interval DESCRIPTION
Market Share Yearly
The ratio of a bank’s assets to the total amount of banks’ assets
in a county (Source: Weber, 2011a).
Age of Banks Yearly
Average age of banks in business at the county level (Source: We-
ber, 2006).
Urbanization Rate Decennial
Fraction of counties’ population living in urban areas. The Census
declared a county population as urban, if at least 2500 inhabitants
lived in urban places (Source: ICPSR 2896 file).
Manufacturing /
Agricultural / Commercial
Share
Decennial
Fraction of persons engaged in manufacturing / agriculture / com-
merce (Source: ICPSR 2896 file). We had to impute the manu-
facturing / agricultural / commercial share for the year 1830 be-
cause no manufacturing / agricultural / manufacturing data were
reported in the 1830 Census at the county level.
Labor Force Participation
Rate
Decennial
Total number of workers divided by total population at the county
level (Source: ICPSR 2896 file).
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: The Eighteen US Free Banking States
States Year
Michigan
New York 1838
Georgia 1838
Alabama 1849
New Jersey 1850
Massachusetts 1851
Vermont 1851
Ohio 1851
Illinois 1851
Connecticut
Indiana 1852
Wisconsin 1852
Tennessee
Florida 1853
Louisiana 1853
Minnesota 1858
Iowa 1858
Pennsylvania 1860
1837/1857(a)
1852(b)
1852(c)
Source: Rockoff (1972)
(a) Michigan suspended the free banking law in 1838 and reenacted it in 1857. Source: Rockoff (1972).
(b) Connecticut repealed the free banking law in 1855. Source: Rockoff (1972).
(c) Tennessee repealed free banking in 1858. Source: Schweikart (1987).
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TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variables Interval Obs Mean Sd
Panel A: County-Level Analysis
Share of New Banks Yearly 10,113 0.0938 0.257
Share of Failed Banks Yearly 10,113 0.0180 0.120
Share of Closed Banks Yearly 10,113 0.0210 0.123
Free Banking Laws Yearly 10,113 0.336 0.472
ln(Output p.c.) Decennial 5,286 4.136 0.547
ln(Manufacturing Output p.c.) Decennial 4,874 2.343 1.327
ln(Agricultural Output p.c.) Decennial 5,259 3.792 0.610
ln(Manufacturing Capital p.c.) Decennial 4,819 1.891 1.296
Loans p.c. Decennial 5,219 0.0650 0.411
Money p.c. Decennial 5,219 0.0402 0.227
Number of Banks Yearly 10,113 2.825 4.533
ln(Population) Decennial 5,589 8.805 1.228
Banks Capital p.c. Decennial 9,344 0.1423 0.3665
Urbanization Rate Decennial 5,589 0.0357 0.126
Manufacturing Share Decennial 5,053 0.125 0.161
Agricultural Share Decennial 5,175 0.828 0.198
Commercial Share Decennial 5,175 0.0568 0.113
Panel B: Bank-Level Analysis
Closure Dummy Yearly 28,569 0.0178 0.132
Failure Dummy Yearly 28,569 0.0129 0.113
Asset Growth Yearly 18,451 0.0291 0.238
Market Share Growth Yearly 18,452 0.0565 0.475
Asset Size (log) Yearly 22,077 8.139 1.059
Loans to Assets Ratio Yearly 22,077 0.739 0.195
Public Bonds to Assets Ratio Yearly 22,077 0.0298 0.110
Cash to Assets Ratio Yearly 22,077 0.0608 0.0649
Capital to Assets Ratio Yearly 22,077 0.461 0.155
Circulation to Assets Ratio Yearly 22,077 0.290 0.153
Deposits to Assets Ratio Yearly 22,077 0.156 0.118
Age Yearly 28,569 14.41 13.61
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TABLE 3
FREE BANKING LAWS AND BANK COMPETITION
– COUNTY-LEVEL ANALYSIS –
Dependent Variable: Share of New Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Free Banking 0.0346*** 0.0402*** 0.0380*** 0.0326***
(0.0116) (0.0123) (0.0117) (0.0114)
Observations 8732 8732 8732 6569
R2 0.080 0.103 0.112 0.113
County FE yes yes yes yes
State Trend yes yes yes yes
Region-by-Year FE yes yes yes yes
Banking Sector Controls no yes yes yes
State Legislation Controls no no yes yes
Initial Controls (1830) no no no yes
The dependent variable is the share of new banks between 1830 and 1860. The estimating equation is (1) and the
method of estimation is least squares. Free Banking is an indicator variable that takes the value one for all years
t since state s introduced a free banking law. We use the number of banks and the average age of banks in t − 1
as controls for county c’s banking sector (estimates not reported in the table), see Section IV.A for more details.
State legislation controls are usury laws, general incorporation laws, shareholder’s liability, branch-banking, state-owned
banks, suspensions of convertibility, liability insurance schemes and clearing house arrangements (estimates not reported
in the table); see Section II for more details. Initial controls are county c’s population size, the urbanization rate, the
manufacturing share, the commercial share, the number of banks per capita, and bank capital per capita in 1830
interacted with a linear and squared time trend (estimate not reported in the table); see Section IV.A for more details.
Huber robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the state level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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TABLE 5
FREE BANKING LAWS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
– COUNTY-LEVEL ANALYSIS –
Dependent Variable: ln(Output per capita) ∆ln(Output per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Free Banking t−1 0.141*** 0.199** 0.256***
(0.0508) (0.0753) (0.0556)
∆Free Banking t−1 0.136** 0.197** 0.218***
(0.0586) (0.0872) (0.0740)
Observations 2907 2907 2907 1537 1537 1537
R2 0.433 0.438 0.445 0.063 0.070 0.120
County FE yes yes yes no no yes
State Trend yes yes yes no no no
State FE no no no yes yes no
Year FE yes yes no yes yes no
Region-by-Year FE no no yes no no yes
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
State Legislation Controls no yes yes no no yes
The dependent variable is the ln(output per capita). In columns (1)-(3) the estimating equation is (2), while for columns (4)-(6)
the estimation equation is (3). The method of estimation is least squares. Free Banking is an indicator variable that equals one
if state s has introduced free banking in t− 1. Further control variables are county c’s population size, the urbanization rate,
the manufacturing share, the agricultural share, the share of blacks, the labor force participation rate, the number of banks and
assets per capita (estimate not reported in the table); see Section V.A for more details. State legislation controls are usury laws,
general incorporation laws, shareholder’s liability, branch-banking, state-owned banks, suspensions of convertibility, liability
insurance schemes and clearing house arrangements (estimates not reported in the table); see Section II for more details.
Huber robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the state level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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TABLE 8
THE PROBABILITY OF BANK FAILURE & CLOSURE
– BANK-LEVEL ANALYSIS –
Dependent Variable: Failure Dummy Closure Dummy
(1) (2)
Free Banking Laws -0.00005 -0.00688*
(0.00341) (0.00337)
Observations 13,632 13,632
R-squared 0.018 0.017
Bank FE yes yes
Year FE yes yes
Banking Sector Controls yes yes
The dependent variable in column (1) is a dummy that equals one if incumbent bank i fails in year t, while in column
(2) the dummy equals one if incumbent bank i closes in year t. Free Banking is an indicator variable that takes the
value one for all years t since state s introduced a free banking law. We use the lagged number of banks at the county
level, the lagged age of banks and its logarithm, and a set of bank balance sheet ratios at the bank level as controls.
The bank balance ratios included are the capital to assets, deposits to assets, circulation to assets, loans to assets, cash
to assets, and public bonds to assets ratios (estimates not reported in the table), see Section VI.B.1 for more details.
Huber robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the state level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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TABLE 12
BORDER COUNTIES: FREE BANKING LAWS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Dependent Variable: ln(Output per capita) ∆ln(Output per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Free Banking t−1 0.159* 0.325** 0.346***
(0.0825) (0.130) (0.0962)
∆Free Banking t−1 0.162*** 0.375*** 0.409***
(0.0613) (0.0879) (0.151)
Observations 1137 1137 1137 607 607 607
R2 0.894 0.897 0.898 0.153 0.183 0.609
County FE yes yes yes no no yes
State Trend yes yes yes no no no
State FE no no no yes yes no
Year FE yes yes no yes yes no
Region-by-Year FE no no yes no no yes
Border Segment Trend yes yes yes no no no
Border Segment FE no no no yes yes yes
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
State Legislation Controls no yes yes no yes yes
The dependent variable is the ln(output per capita). In columns (1)-(3) the estimating equation is (2), while for columns (4)-(6)
the estimation equation is (3). The method of estimation is least squares; see Section VII.C for more details. Free Banking is an
indicator variable that equals one if state s has introduced free banking in t−1. Further control variables are county c’s population
size, the urbanization rate, the manufacturing share, the agricultural share, the share of blacks, the labor force participation rate,
the number of banks and assets per capita (estimate not reported in the table); see Section V.A for more details. State legislation
controls are usury laws, general incorporation laws, shareholder’s liability, branch-banking, state-owned banks, suspensions of
convertibility, liability insurance schemes and clearing house arrangements (estimates not reported in the table); see Section II for
more details. Huber robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the state level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 1:
Dynamic Effect of Free Banking Laws on the Share of New Banks
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Notes: Coefficients from the dynamic estimating equation (6), discussed in Section VII.B.
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Figure 2:
Dynamic Effect of Free Banking Laws on the Share of Failed Banks
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Notes: Coefficients from the dynamic estimating equation (6), discussed in Section VII.B.
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APPENDIX TABLE 1
FREE BANKING LAWS AND BANK COMPETITION
– HETEROSKEDASTIC FRACTIONAL PROBIT MODEL –
Dependent Variable: Share of New Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Free Banking 0.0620* 0.0825*** 0.0813*** 0.0543**
(0.0331) (0.0297) (0.0272) (0.0230)
Observations 9344 9344 9344 6943
Quinquennial Year FE yes yes yes yes
Banking Sector Controls no yes yes yes
State Legislation Controls no no yes yes
Initial Controls (1830) no no no yes
The dependent variable is the share of new banks between 1830 and 1860. The method of estimation is a heteroskedastic
fractional probit model; see Wooldridge (2010) for more details. Free Banking is an indicator variable that takes the
value one for all years t since state s introduced a free banking law. The statistics reported in the table are the
marginal effects of Free Banking and their standard errors. We use the number of banks and the average age of banks
in t−1 as controls for county c’s banking sector (estimates not reported in the table), see Section IV.A for more details.
State legislation controls are usury laws, general incorporation laws, shareholder’s liability, branch-banking, state-owned
banks, suspensions of convertibility, liability insurance schemes and clearing house arrangements (estimates not reported
in the table); see Section II for more details. Initial controls are county c’s population size, the urbanization rate, the
manufacturing share, the commercial share, the number of banks per capita, and bank capital per capita in 1830
interacted with a linear time trend (estimate not reported in the table); see Section IV.A for more details. Following
Wooldridge (2010, pp.10-11), we add the time average of county c’s right-hand side variables over the years we observe
the full set of data on the control and outcome variables. We further add to the estimating equation and to the
variance function the number of years observed for each county in our sample (see Wooldridge, 2010, pp.28-29). Huber
robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the state level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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APPENDIX TABLE 2
FREE BANKING LAWS AND BANK FAILURES
– HETEROSKEDASTIC FRACTIONAL PROBIT MODEL –
Dependent Variable: Share of Failed Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Free Banking 0.0353*** 0.0302** 0.0296*** 0.0170
(0.0121) (0.0120) (0.0113) (0.0106)
Observations 6681 6681 6681 5051
Quinquennial Year FE yes yes yes yes
Banking Sector Controls no yes yes yes
State Legislation Controls no no yes yes
Initial Controls (1830) no no no yes
The dependent variable is the share of failed banks between 1830 and 1860. The method of estimation is a het-
eroskedastic fractional probit model; see Wooldridge (2010) for more details. Free Banking is an indicator variable that
takes the value one for all years t since state s introduced a free banking law. The statistics reported in the table
are the marginal effects of Free Banking and their standard errors. We use the number of banks, the average age of
banks in t − 1 and a set of bank balance sheet ratios as controls for county c’s banking sector. The bank balance
ratios included are the capital to assets, deposits to assets, circulation to assets, loans to assets, cash to assets, and
public bonds to assets ratios (estimates not reported in the table), see Section IV.A for more details. State legisla-
tion controls are usury laws, general incorporation laws, shareholder’s liability, branch-banking, state-owned banks,
suspensions of convertibility, liability insurance schemes and clearing house arrangements (estimates not reported in
the table); see Section II for more details. Initial controls are county c’s population size, the urbanization rate, the
manufacturing share, the commercial share, the number of banks per capita, and bank capital per capita in 1830 in-
teracted with a linear time trend (estimate not reported in the table); see Section IV.A for more details. Following
Wooldridge (2010, pp.10-11), we add the time average of county c’s right-hand side variables over the years we ob-
serve the full set of data on the control and outcome variables. We further add to the estimating equation and to
the variance function the number of years observed for each county in our sample (see Wooldridge, 2010, pp.28-29).
Huber robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the state level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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APPENDIX TABLE 3
FREE BANKING LAWS AND PROBABILITY OF BANK FAILURE & CLOSURE
– HETEROSKEDASTIC PROBIT MODEL –
Dependent Variables: Failure Dummy Closure Dummy
(1) (2)
Free Banking Laws 0.013** -0.0369**
(0.005) (0.015)
Observations 10,850 11,051
Year FE yes yes
Banking Sector Controls yes yes
The dependent variables are the failure and closure dummies, which captures respectively whether bank i failed and
closed in year t. The method of estimation is a heteroskedastic probit model; see Wooldridge (2010) for more details.
Free Banking is an indicator variable that takes the value one for all years t since state s introduced a free banking
law. The statistics reported in the table are the marginal effects of Free Banking and their standard errors. We use the
lagged number of banks, the lagged age of banks and its logarithm, and a set of bank balance sheet ratios as controls.
The bank balance ratios included are the capital to assets, deposits to assets, circulation to assets, loans to assets, cash
to assets, and public bonds to assets ratios (estimates not reported in the table), see Section VI.B.1 for more details.
Following Wooldridge (2010, pp.10-11), we add the time average of county c’s right-hand side variables over the years
we observe the full set of data on the control and outcome variables. We further add to the estimating equation and
to the variance function the number of years observed for each county in our sample (see Wooldridge, 2010, pp.28-29).
Huber robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the state level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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